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Introduction
Water is one of our basic resources, but it is often short. The total amount of fresh water available would be sufficient to provide the present world population with a minimally required amount of water. However, the uneven distribution of water and people among regions has made the adequate supply critical for a growing number of countries (Seckler, Amarasinghe, Molden, Silve & Barker, 1998) . Rapid population growth and increasing consumption of water per capita has aggravated the problem.
Water withdrawal for most uses is projected to increase by at least 50% by 2025 compared to 1995 level (Rosegrant, Cai & Cline, 2002 ). An additional reason for concern is climate change.
Climate change models predict that geographic differences in rainfall are likely to become more pronounced with increased precipitation in high latitudes, and decreased rainfall elsewhere.
Higher temperatures would imply larger water demand and higher evaporation (IPCC, 2001) .
As the supply of water is limited, attempts have been made to economize on the consumption of water, especially in regions where the supply is critical. One way to address the problem is to reduce the inefficiencies in irrigation and urban water systems from existing water uses. In urban water systems, water is wasted through leakage. This is particularly pronounced for large cities in Africa, Asia, Latin America and even in the water-scarce Middle East (Rosegrant et al., 2002 ). Yet, in 2000 about 70% of all water was used for agriculture. 1 For some developing countries the average irrigation efficiency is far below what is technically possible. The current level and structure of water charges mostly do not encourage farmers to use water more efficiently. Also for countries not short of water there seems to be room for improvement (Seckler et al., 1998 ).
An increase in water price, for instance by a tax, would lead to the adoption of improved irrigation technology (e.g., Dinar and Yaron, 1992) . The water saved could be used in other sectors, for which the value is much higher. In this paper, we do not look at a reallocation of water, but we do look at a reallocation of water-intensive products. National and international markets of agricultural products would be affected. A complete understanding of a water pricing policy is therefore impossible without understanding the international markets for food and other agricultural products, such as textiles.
There would be strong opposition against higher water prices, especially in water scarce regions. In many regions, water use is even subsidized. This is partly because of desired food selfsufficiency (Ahmad, 2000) . However, food demand could be met by importing more water-intensive food from water abundant countries, and producing and exporting commodities that are less water-intensive. The water embedded in commodities is also 1 Number is taken from AQUASTAT.
known as virtual water (Allan, 1992 and 1993 for all practical purposes, limited to primary production, whereas price instruments can be used at production as well as at consumption levels.
In this paper, we present the GTAP-W model and illustrate its potential application to water pricing policies. We use arbitrary water tax scenarios, as our main concern is methodological. We aim to demonstrate that water tax policies would generate spillover effects for economic activities and water consumption in other industries and regions than taxed. This analysis complements the one in Berrittella et al. (2005) , in which we use the same model for different policy simulations.
Section 2 reviews the literature on water pricing. Section 2 also shows that our approach is complementary to what other people have done, as the price for economic comprehensiveness is a lack of detail in production and space. Section 3 presents the model used and the data on water resources and water use. The basic model and the corresponding data can be purchased from the Ahmad, 2000; Dinar and Subramanian, 1998; Jones, 1998; Rogers, Silva & Bhatia, 2002) . Other studies have analyzed the economic value of water, the costs of its provision and the price for its use (Rogers, Silva & Bhatia, 1998; Ward and Michelsen, 2002; Young, 2005 They show that water supply constrains could improve allocative efficiency, as agricultural markets are heavily distorted. The welfare gain may more than offset the welfare losses due to the resource constraint. In contrast to Berrittella et al.
(forthcoming), this study is concerned with demand management (rather than with changes in water supply); this paper investigates the economic implications of water pricing policies.
Modeling framework and data
To assess the systemic, general equilibrium effects on water resource demand induced by different policy scenarios, we use a multi-region world The GTAP model is a standard CGE static model distributed with the GTAP database of the world economy (www.gtap.org). For detailed information see Hertel (1997) and the technical references and papers available on the GTAP website. The 16 sectors are rice; wheat; other cereals and crops; vegetables and fruits; animals; forestry; fishing; coal mining; oil; natural gas extraction; refined oil products; electricity; water collection, purification and distribution services; energy intensive industries; other industry and services; market services; non-market services.
household consumption, public consumption and savings (see Berrittella et al., forthcoming, for more detailed information). The expenditure shares are generally fixed, which amounts to saying that the top-level utility function has a Cobb-Douglas specification. Private consumption is split in a series of alternative composite Armington aggregates. The functional specification used at this level is the Constant Difference in Elasticities (CDE) form: a non-homothetic function, which is used to account for possible differences in income elasticities for the various consumption goods. A money metric measure of economic welfare, the equivalent variation, can be computed from the model output.
In the GTAP model and its variants, two industries are treated in a special way and are not related to any region. International transport is a world industry, which produces the transportation services associated with the movement of goods between origin and destination regions, thereby determining the cost margin between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices. Transport services are produced by means of factors submitted by all countries, in variable proportions. In a similar way, a hypothetical world bank collects savings from all regions and allocates investments so as to achieve equality of expected future rates of return.
In our modeling framework, water is combined with the value-added-energy nest and the intermediate inputs (see Berrittella et al., forthcoming, for more detailed information). As in the original GTAP model, there is no substitutability between intermediate inputs and value-added for the production function of tradeable goods and services. In the benchmark equilibrium, water supply is supposed to be unconstrained, so that water demand is lower or equal than water supply, and the price for water is zero.
Water is supplied to the agricultural industry, which includes primary crop production and livestock, and to the water distribution services sector, which delivers water to the rest of the economic sectors.
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The key parameter for the determination of regional water use is the water intensity coefficient. This is defined as the amount of water necessary for sector j to produce one unit of commodity.
6 To estimate water intensity coefficients, we first calculated total water use by commodity and country for the year 1997. For the agricultural sector the FAOSTAT database provided information on production of primary crops and livestock. This includes detailed information on different crop types and animal categories.
Information on water requirements for crop growth and animal feeding was taken from Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004) . 7 The water requirement includes both the use of blue water (ground and surface water) as well as green water (moisture stored in soil strata). For crops it is defined as the sum of water needed for evapotranspiration, from planting to harvest, and depends on crop type and region. This procedure assumes that water is not short and no water is lost by irrigation inefficiencies. For animals, the virtual water content is mainly the sum of water needed for feeding and drinking. The water intensity parameter for the water distribution sector is 5
Note that distributed water can have a price, even if primary water resources are in excess supply.
6
This refers to water directly used in the production process, not to the water indirectly needed to produce other input factors.
7
This information is provided as an average over the period from 1997 to 2001. By making use of this data we assume that water requirements are constant at least in the short term.
based on the country's industrial and domestic water use data provided by AQUASTAT.
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We make the link between output levels and water demand sensitive to water prices, by assuming that more expensive water brings about rationalization in usage and substitution with other factors. The actual capability of reducing the relative intensity of water demand is industryspecific, and captured by an industrial water price elasticity parameter (Table 1) . We run four alternative simulation exercises, each dealing with the economic impacts of water pricing policies.
In the base scenario (scenario 1), we impose a water charge of $10 mln per 10 9 m 3 of water for all users. This is equivalent to a price increase of ¢1 per cubic meter of water. The aim of this scenario is to test how much water saving can be achieved, and at what economic cost. As a first sensitivity analysis, in the second scenario, we lower the price to ¢0.5/m 3 . In scenarios 1-3, water is taxed when used in production. In scenario 4, final consumption is taxed, proportional to the water used in the production of the consumption goods. We apply a water charge of $10 mln per 10 9 m 3 of water.
In all scenarios, the revenue of the water tax is redistributed, lump sum, to the representative household.
Simulation results
Results for all scenarios described in section 4 are presented in Tables 2 to 5 , reporting water demand, virtual water trade balance, GDP, trade balance and welfare. The virtual water trade balance reports, similar to the trade balance, the difference between a region's exports to its imports measured in water quantities.
In scenario 1, reported in Table 2 , we simulate a water tax of $10 mln per 10 9 m 3 of water. The increase in water prices leads to a decrease in water demand in all regions, except in Western
Europe. This region has a low water-intensity and shows little sensitivity to changes in prices for water. Consequently, although water prices increase, agricultural production is raised, and water-intensive products are exported to other regions. The virtual water trade balance is positive for Western Europe. North
Africa exhibits the highest reduction in water demand. This is because the water-intensity of this region is high. The water tax leads to a net increase in virtual water imports in regions that are relatively water-intensive, such as North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. These are also the regions with limited water resource availability. Water-short countries partly meet their demand for water-intensive products by importing them.
Global welfare falls due to the increase of water prices and the restriction of a scarce resource. However, welfare losses are not universal; some regions gain as their competitive position improves, such as the USA and Western Europe.
Applying the water tax only to agricultural sectors (results not shown), total water demand is higher than in the first scenario, because there is no change in the water charge for the water distribution services sector. The more water-intensive the agricultural sectors are, the higher is the deficit in terms of virtual water trade balance. Overall, taxing agricultural water use only is a reasonably effective policy. It deviates from the optimum of taxing all water use, but the welfare loss is limited.
The scenario results depend to some extend on the water price elasticity (results not shown). If there is no flexibility in water intensity at the level of farms and water distribution companies, countries cannot improve their water efficiency in domestic production. The global water demand is higher (decreases less) than in scenario 1. On the regional level the change in demand differs; demand decreases less, increases rather than decreases, or increases more depending on the regions' water price elasticity as well as the water-intensity coefficient. The global welfare decreases more, because the resource constraint is more stringent. Although the regional pattern is the same as in scenario 1, regions with higher price elasticities suffer more if they cannot improve their water efficiency in domestic production. Table 3 reports the simulation results of scenario 2, where water is taxed at $5 mln per 10 9 m 3 . As expected, water demand falls, but less so than in scenario 1. Comparing the two sets of results, the reduction of water demand is slightly less than linear in the water tax. Water price increase is half the amount of scenario 1, but water demand decreases more than 50% for most regions.
Table 2 about here
Welfare falls in the more water intensive countries, such as North Africa and the Middle East, but less so than in scenario 1.
The opposite occurs for more water efficient regions, such as Western Europe and the USA. At world level, welfare falls, but a factor 7 less so than in scenario 1 (-$125 mln compared to -$846 mln).
Table 3 about here
In scenario 3, we increase the water charges only for water-short regions, viz. North Africa, China, the USA and South Asia (see Table 4 ). The water demand decreases in these four regions, the more so in the less water efficient ones, such as North Africa. In terms of virtual water trade, as expected, an increase in the water price leads to an increase in virtual water import in the constrained regions, and to a decrease in virtual water exports.
On the other hand, a deficit in terms of virtual water trade is not always accompanied by a negative variation in the trade balance. In this paper, we present a computable general equilibrium model of the world economy with water as an explicit factor of production. We use the model to test water taxes under different scenarios. In the base scenario, we simulate a water charge of $10 mln per 10 9 m 3 of water. As expected, the water demand decreases in many regions, but some regions find it profitable to raise the production of water-intensive commodities in order to export them. The world as a whole is worse off, although some countries gain as their competitive position improves. Water demand falls less than linear in the water tax; welfare losses are more than linear in the water tax. The impact of a water tax is more pronounced if it is harder to improve water efficiency. For some world regions, the water supply is already critical.
Rapid population growth and increasing consumption per capita has further aggregated the problem. An additional reason for concern is climate change. Today, most problems in the water sector are caused by large differences between the private and the social price of water. Although an optimal policy would include all water using sectors, a water tax on agriculture, the main water user, has a significant impact on water savings already. Such a policy would considerably reduce the gap between the private and the social cost of water. For water-short countries, it would be beneficial if water is not taxed abroad.
Water taxes in water-rich countries would further increase market prices for agricultural goods and raise the price of imported water-intensive products. To limit the negative impact of rising world market prices for water-intensive products, a water tax should be accompanied by policies promoting the substitutes for water-intensive products, improved irrigation, limiting water leakage, and improved efficiency. Another important issue is the crop mix. A different mix with less water demanding crops, which are perhaps also more adapted to heat, might reduce water demand further. Trade liberalization might help as well, as it stimulates substitution.
The analysis establishes two things. Firstly, domestic policies to conserve water, here implemented by a water tax, has ramifications for international trade. As a result, national water policies are interconnected and should, at the least, not be set in ignorance of other countries' water policies. Secondly, the effects of water policy on national economies and international trade can gainfully be studied with a computable general equilibrium model. The data used in this paper to extend the GTAP-CGE, are in the public domain.
This analysis needs to be extended in several ways and a number of limitations apply. First, we have not been able to allocate industrial water use to its different users. We rather used a simplifying assumption that water for domestic and industry use is supplied by the water service sector. Second, we consider regional water supply, implicitly assuming that there is a perfect water market and costless water transport within each region.
Sector-specific water resources allow for sub-regional differentiation of water resources, but only to a limited extent.
Third, we were not able to differentiate between the different qualities of water supplied. Some, but not all, of the difference is captured by defining sector-specific water. Fourth, in our model we assume that water is used efficiently and no water is wasted.
The water intensity coefficient captures some differences, but these differences do not respond to price or other signals, except to the price of water. Fifth, for the agricultural sector, we used irrigation water plus rainfall, without distinction; water use is gross water use, ignoring evapotranspiration by crops. Sixth, we nested water at the upper level in the production function of the water intensive goods and services, so that water cannot be substituted with specific inputs in the production processes.
Seventh, we used a single data set for water use and water resources, ignoring the uncertainties in the data. All this is deferred to future research.
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